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Abstract—Steganographic methods allow the covert exchange 
of secret data between parties aware of the procedure. The 
cloud computing environment is a new and hot target for 
steganographers, and currently not many solutions have been 
proposed. This paper proposes CloudSteg which is a 
steganographic method that allows the creation of a covert 
channel based on hard disk contention between the two cloud 
instances that reside on the same physical machine. 
Experimental results conducted using open source cloud 
environment OpenStack, show that CloudSteg is able to 
achieve a bandwidth of about 0.1 bps which is 1000 times 
higher than is known from the state-of-the-art version. 
Keywords: covert channel, steganography, cloud computing, 
information hiding 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing is a very popular and still evolving 
paradigm. It allows customers of cloud providers to avoid 
start-up costs and/or reduce operating costs. It also increases 
their flexibility by immediately acquiring services and 
infrastructural resources when needed. NIST (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology) defines cloud 
computing as [1]: “a model for enabling ubiquitous, 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, 
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort 
or service provider interaction”. Key characteristics of cloud 
computing include: on-demand self-service, broad network 
access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured 
service. NIST also defines three service models in which 
cloud users control: 
1. Only user-specific application configurations, known 
as SaaS (Software as a Service), 
2. Deployed applications and possibly application hosting 
environment configurations, known as PaaS (Platform 
as a Service), 
3. Everything (e.g. operating systems, storage, deployed 
applications) except the underlying cloud 
infrastructure, known as IaaS (Infrastructure as a 
Service). 
 
Steganographic techniques can be used to provide a 
perfect tool for data exfiltration, to enable network attacks or 
hidden communication among secret parties. The aim of 
these techniques is to hide secret data in the innocent 
looking carrier e.g. in normal transmissions of users. It is 
important to note that steganography embraces all the 
methods that can be used to create covert channels in a 
networking environment. Depending on the extent of the 
created covert channel it can be network (allowing to 
communicate secretly through the network) or local (the 
extent is limited to the single physical machine) [16].  
In an ideal situation such hidden data exchange cannot 
be detected by third parties. The best carrier for secret data 
must possess two features: it should be popular i.e. usage of 
such a carrier should not be considered as an anomaly itself, 
and modification of the carrier related to inserting the 
steganogram should not be “visible” to a third party not 
aware of the steganographic procedure. 
Every steganographic method can be described typically 
by the following set of characteristics [16]: its 
steganographic bandwidth, undetectability, and robustness. 
The term “steganographic bandwidth” refers to the amount 
of secret data that can be sent per unit time when using a 
particular method. Undetectability is defined as the inability 
to detect a steganogram within a certain carrier. The most 
popular way to detect a steganogram is to analyse the 
statistical properties of the captured data and compare them 
with the typical values for that carrier. The last 
characteristic, robustness, is defined as the amount of 
alteration a steganogram can withstand without secret data 
being destroyed. 
Of course a good steganographic method should be as 
robust and hard to detect as possible while offering the 
highest bandwidth. However it must be noted that there is 
always a fundamental trade-off among these three measures 
that is necessary. 
 
Fig. 1. Hidden communication scenarios for cloud computing environment 
[13] (CSI – Cloud Service Instance, C – Cloud Clients/Customers) 
 
In the Internet today we witness expansion of different, 
advanced services from which more and more are migrating 
to cloud computing services. The major cloud service 
providers are significantly investing in their infrastructure 
  
and in acquiring customers. The important players‟ list 
includes: Google (Gmail, GoogleDocs), Microsoft (Azure), 
Amazon (Amazon Web Services), Cisco (WebEx). These 
services utilise sometimes complex protocols and 
infrastructures to achieve their goals. Therefore, they can be 
considered as perfect candidates for secret data carriers 
because, generally, the more complex protocols/services are, 
the more opportunities for information hiding. Indeed the 
cloud computing environment becomes a new and hot target 
for steganographers and currently not many information 
hiding solutions have been proposed ([4-11]). 
In [13] we proposed to consider three types of 
steganographic communication in cloud computing based on 
where the secret data receiver (SR) is placed (Fig. 1). All 
these scenarios require, of course, hiding intentions with 
which cloud services will be used: 
(1) SR is situated in the same cloud instance as the secret 
data sender (SS). This case considers the scenario in 
which two cloud service users exchange confidential 
data for which at least one of them is unauthorised. 
Such communication includes utilisation of the so-
called network steganography methods that use 
network protocols (data units or the way they are 
exchanged), or relations between two or more 
protocols as a hidden data carrier [14]. In this case a 
network covert channel is created. 
(2) SR is situated outside the cloud service environment 
and cloud service capabilities are used to perform 
network attacks. In this case steganographic 
communication can be used e.g. to coordinate cloud 
botnet or malware [2]. This type of communication 
may also include utilisation of network steganographic 
techniques. In this case a network covert channel is 
created. 
(3) SR is situated in a different cloud instance than SS but 
in the same cloud service environment. Realization of 
such covert communication is typically possible by 
utilisation of the common shared resources for 
steganographic purposes and they can relay e.g. on data 
cross deduplication mechanism [3] or caches shared by 
services instances on the same physical machines [7]. 
In this case a local covert channel is created. 
 
In this paper we investigate the last scenario. We focus 
on improving the steganographic methods that allow the 
creation of local covert channels. The first work that 
initiated discussion on covert communication in the cloud 
computing environment was introduced by Ristenpart et al. 
[7] in 2009. Among many identified covert channels there, 
in which two cloud instances cooperate to send secret 
messages via a shared resource, authors describe a method 
that relies on hard disk contention between co-resident 
instances. The obtained steganographic bandwidth for this 
solution in their work was 0.0005 bps (however, it must be 
noted that authors made no attempts to optimize it, as it was 
utilized to determine co-residence of the instances).  
 
Therefore the main contribution of this paper is to show 
to what extent the hard disk contention-based method can be 
further improved. Our experimental results suggest that it is 
able to achieve a bandwidth of about 0.1 bps which is 1000 
times higher than previously reported in [7]. The 
improvement is achieved mainly by applying three 
synchronization mechanisms (compare Section IV B): 
(1) First, that allows to discover the beginning of the 
transmitted secret data bit, 
(2) Symbol synchronization mechanism, 
(3) Frame synchronization mechanism.  
 
The process of exchanging covert data between SS and 
SR in CloudSteg is fully automated, and proof-of-concept 
implementation is realized and evaluated in an open source 
OpenStack cloud environment [12]. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II 
presents the state-of-the-art in information hiding for cloud 
computing environment. In Section III threat model and 
assumptions are pointed out. Section IV describes CloudSteg 
in details and Section V presents its experimental evaluation. 
Finally, Section VI concludes our work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Information hiding in a cloud computing environment is 
quite a new research field which has already attracted the 
attention of the research community.  
As mentioned in the previous section, the first paper that 
started discussion on potential opportunities for hidden 
communication in cloud computing was work published in 
2009 by Ristenpart et al. [7]. Many of the consecutive papers 
greatly relied on the foundations that this work provided. Its 
main aim was not solely focused on identifying possible 
covert channels. The goal was rather to present means to 
determine co-residence of the instances in a public 
Amazon‟s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) service. EC2 
allows users to rent its computational resources capabilities 
and utilize them for their own use. After the co-residence is 
established cross-virtual machines information leakage is 
proved to be possible based on the commonly shared 
resources contention. This is how a local covert channel is 
created that enables one way (side channel) or both way data 
exchange.  
In the rest of this section we review the existing 
information hiding methods based on what shared resource 
is utilized as a hidden data carrier: CPU, RAM or hard disk, 
consecutively. 
Utilization of shared CPU was first proposed by 
Ristenpart et al. [7]. Authors introduced a steganographic 
technique based on CPU L2 cache. L2 cache is utilized to 
store recently accessed information between L1 cache and 
RAM memory. The key idea of the proposed method to 
enable secret data exchange between co-resident cloud 
instances is to access frantically L2 cache when binary „1‟ is 
to be sent, and remain idle in case binary „0‟ is to be 
transmitted. The experimentally obtained steganographic 
bandwidth of such method was about 0.2 bps. 
Next, Xu et al. [10] proposed improvements of this 
method by adjusting this technique to new policies in 
Amazon EC2 and increasing the available steganographic 
bandwidth to about 3.2 bps on average. 
  
In [6] Okamura et al. designed and evaluated a similar 
approach which utilized the load of a shared CPU to encode 
secret data bits. The resulting steganographic bandwidth was 
about 2 bps. However this work has little practical 
applicability as it only works under the assumption that both 
colluding cloud instances share the same processor‟s 
physical core, which for modern servers based on multi-core 
processors is hard to achieve. A similar approach, but 
utilizing the SMT (Simultaneous Multi-Threading) 
technique, was proposed by Wang and Lee [8]. The 
drawback of this method is that it can be only applied to 
machines that support SMT. 
Zhang et al. [11] monitor the patterns of L2 cache usage 
within a guest domain to build a classifier of the usage 
patterns. Such an approach allows the utilization of the 
covert channel, not for exfiltration of sensitive user data, but 
to check if there are other VMs sharing the same physical 
machine (defensive detection tool). 
The first work that proposed to utilize shared memory 
for covert communication was introduced by Xiao et al. [9]. 
Authors described a steganographic method based on 
memory deduplication. This technique is usually utilized to 
improve memory efficiency and is typically implemented 
using a variant of copy-on-write techniques, for which, 
writing to a shared page would incur a longer access time 
than to those non-shared. This characteristic feature was 
utilized to create a local covert channel. If one intentionally 
increases access delay to some parts of the memory then 
binary „1‟is sent and in the other case binary „0‟. The 
reported steganographic bandwidth was about 80 bps. 
As mentioned in the previous section for hard disk 
sharing Ristenpart et al. [7] introduced a mechanism to 
determine co-residence of the instances that relies on the 
shared hard disk contention. To send binary „1‟, the sender 
instance reads from random locations on a shared disk 
volume and to send binary „0‟ no operation is required. The 
receiving side infers that „1‟ was sent from the longer read 
times and „0‟ in the other case. The obtained steganographic 
bandwidth in this case was 0.0005 bps; this means that it 
takes about 33 minutes to transfer a single bit of secret data. 
In this paper we propose CloudSteg which is a 
significantly improved version of the hard disk contention 
based method originally proposed by Ristenpart et al. Our 
experiment revealed that it is possible to achieve a 1000 
times higher steganographic bandwidth with good 
robustness and undetectability. 
III. THREAT MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS 
In this work, similarly as in [7] we consider a public 
cloud service provider which is trusted as well as this 
infrastructure. The provider is able to rent computational 
resources to the users for their own purpose. Users can run 
one or more copies of VM images and each of the running 
images is called an instance. While such an image starts it is 
assigned a single physical machine for its lifetime. 
We further assume the scenario 3 from Fig. 1 i.e. that 
there are two cloud instances: one owned by the user which 
we refer to as secret data sender (SS) and the other one 
which is a secret data receiver (SR). We also assume that the 
co-residency phase is successfully completed i.e. that it is 
ensured and verified services, that instances are on the same 
physical machine (the ways to accomplish this are presented 
in [7] and [10] ). In such an environment SS and SR utilize 
the hard disk contention feature specific for cloud computing 
services to apply the steganographic method that results in a 
local covert channel which allows secret data exchange.  
Both users also possess a pre-shared key that allows to 
define at what data rate secret data bits will be transmitted. 
IV. THE METHOD 
To provide successful covert communication CloudSteg 
utilizes control fields that are required mainly for 
synchronization purposes. The format of the encapsulated 
secret message is presented in Fig. 2 and each 8-bit sequence 
in control fields forms a frame. The secret message to be 
sent is formed and encapsulated at SS and it starts from two 
symbol synchronization frames (the 16-bits sequence of 
„1010…‟). The next field is a frame synchronization 
sequence (8 bits), which marks the start of user data. After 
this the user‟s secret data is inserted („XYZ…T‟ in Fig. 2) 
and then the sequence that marks the end of user data 
(„00001111‟) follows. The end sequence is added to be able 
to carry variable length user data. To ensure that 
synchronization bits do not mix up with the user data bit 
stuffing is utilized. 
Fig. 2. The format of the encapsulated user data. 
Therefore, the basic steps of CloudSteg are as follows. 
At the SS: 
STEP1: Utilize bit stuffing on user secret data. 
STEP2: Encapsulate user data with synchronization 
sequences described above. 
STEP3: Choose files that will be used for the hidden data 
exchange. 
STEP4: Encode the resulting secret message into the time 
change vector (TCV) – for details see next subsection. 
STEP5: Send secret message by differentiating files‟ read 
times.  
 
At the receiving side SR performs the following steps: 
STEP1: Performs measurements of the hard disk access 
times. 
STEP2: Discovers the beginning of the secret message. 
STEP3: Decodes the bits of secret message. 
STEP4: Performs symbol and frame synchronizations to 
successfully decapsulate secret message and to extract user 
data. 
STEP5: Removes redundant bits inserted by bit stuffing 
algorithm. 
  
A. Secret Data Sender 
As denoted in Section III we assume that two VM 
instances co-reside on the shared physical machine and in 
particular use, and share the same hard disk. In such a 
situation if one of them tries to access its files frantically 
then it affects the read times of the other instance. This key 
observation was utilized to enable covert communication in 
CloudSteg. 
When SS wants to send secret data then first he applies 
bit stuffing on user data and then encapsulates them with 
synchronization fields (SS steps 1-2). 
The next step is to choose the files that are going to be 
accessed when the covert communication starts. The n files 
(n≥1) are randomly chosen to be utilized for this purpose 
(SS step 3). For example, if SS wants to send binary „1‟ then 
he accesses the chosen files repeatedly for the predetermined 
bit time period (known a priori to both communication 
sides). However if binary „0‟ is to be sent then SS remains 
idle for the bit time period. SS tries to access many files 
instead of a single one to increase the chance of successful 
decoding of the secret data by SR. It also allows it to cope 
with sophisticated modern hard disk queuing methods, 
which may negatively impact the decoding process.  
Next, the encapsulated, binary secret message (from step 
2) is mapped into time change vector (step 4). TCV reflects 
the time that the SS should devote to accessing the files or 
remain idle. For example: if the secret message is [1, 0, 1, 0] 
and the chosen bit time is 5000 ms then the resulting, 
corresponding TCV is equal to [5000, 5000, 5000, 5000]. It 
is also worth noting that every secret message always starts 
with binary „1‟ due to the structure of the symbol 
synchronization sequence (see Fig. 2). Therefore, the TCV 
can be interpreted as follows: spend 5000 ms accessing the 
files, then 5000 ms stay idle, etc. Such mapping is especially 
beneficial if the secret data consist of repeating bit 
subsequences. Let us consider secret data of [1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 
0, 0, 0] and let us assume that bit time is 3000 ms then the 
resulting TCV is represented as [3000, 3000, 9000, 12000]. 
Thus, SS first accesses the files for 3000 ms, then stays idle 
for the same time period. Next, it again accesses the files but 
for 9000 ms, and finally stays idle for 12000 ms. 
It must be emphasised that accessing multiple files 
requires that each file is accessed in a separate thread. This 
results in a potential problem when such threads must be 
stopped when the bit time ends. To avoid extensive files 
accessing which can negatively affect the secret bits 
encoding (especially for the large n) the following parameter 
th (threshold) is introduced. It specifies how long, before the 
bit time ends, SS starts to kill files accessing process (kills 
the threads). For example, if secret data is [1, 1, 1, 1], bit 
time is 300 ms and th=0.9 it means that th shortens the time 
of last bit time to 270 ms to be sure they are all stopped 
before bit time expires. Therefore, the whole sequence will 
cause the chosen files to be accessed for 1170 ms. From our 
observations th depends on n (for details see Section VB). 
B. Secret Data Receiver 
SR aims at measuring average files‟ access time in the 
defined probing interval (pri). It starts measurements by 
opening the measurement window which is of a size of pri 
and monitors average hard disk access time in this period.    
SR starts inspecting hard disk contention independently 
of SS. This means that SR is not aware whether SS has 
already started transmission or not and what secret bit has 
been sent. SR must decode secret information based on the 
performed measurements as well as on the predetermined 
bit time which is known by both covert communication 
sides. 
To be able to successfully detect the beginning of the secret 
transmission an automatic approach is proposed: SR 
analyses the incoming secret data in octets and the 
analysis‟s phases are illustrated in Fig. 3. These phases are: 
Phase 1: Detection of the beginning of the secret bit. 
Phase 2: Determining the binary value for each received bit 
and global average bit value for all of the received secret 
bits. 
Phase 3: Performing symbol synchronization. 
Phase 4: Performing frame synchronization. 
 
Fig. 3. SR phases: a) detection of the beginning of the secret bit; b) 
averaging values during single bit time; c) global average bit value; d) 
corrected global average bit value.  
 
Phase 1: Detection of the beginning of the secret bit 
Due to the fact that SR does not have any information 
regarding the start of hidden data transmission it requires a 
mechanism to automatically detect the start of the secret bit.  
To explain the method we propose to address this issue. 
We define a subsequence that is a fixed number of the 
consecutive measurements‟ values that has a length of bit 
time. For example, if the measurement values retrieved by 
the SR are represented by the set: [A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H] 
and the length of the bit consist of 3 measurements then 
exemplary subsequences can be: [B, C, D], [C, D, E], or [E, 
F, G]. 
  
Detection of the beginning of the secret bit is based on 
determining subsequences’ minimal variance values. It is 
based on the observation that subsequences which exactly 
match the beginning of the transmitted secret bits always 
have lowest variance values. The example of this concept is 
illustrated in Fig. 4. We can observe that the calculated 
subsequences‟ variance values are always the lowest when 
they match exactly the beginning of the secret bit. 
 
Fig. 4. Detection of the beginning of the secret bit. 
 
To correctly determine the lowest subsequences‟ variance 
values, we first define disjoint subsequences which we call 
upper level subsequences. For example, if the 
measurements‟ results are defined by the set [A, B, C, D, E, 
F, G, H, I, J, K] and bit time consists of 3 measurements 
then the upper level subsequences are [A, B, C], [D, E, F], 
[G, H, I]. We omit subsequences that are shorter than bit 
time (e.g. [J, K]). Then in the next step we look for the 
minimum variances‟ values for each upper level 
subsequence using so-called lower level subsequences i.e. 
those subsequences that have the same length as upper level 
subsequence and begin with an element from a certain 
upper level subsequence. For example, for upper level 
subsequence [A, B, C] the possible lower level 
subsequences are: [A, B, C], [B, C, D] and [C, D, E]. Then 
we calculate the variances for each of these subsequences 
and choose the one with the lowest value as a bit start 
(denoted with red lines in Fig. 4). 
The last step is to analyse the set of subsequences with 
the lowest variance values and to choose the one that fits 
best to represent transmitted bits. It is achieved by 
utilization of some simple relationships e.g. if there are two 
disjoint and not neighbouring subsequences, then the time 
between these subsequences must be equal to bit time 
period or its multiplicity, etc.  
 
Phase 2: Determining the binary values for each received 
bit 
After the previous phase is successfully completed SR is 
aware of each bit start and stop times. Therefore, based on 
the measurement values in these periods for each bit time 
we must determine the resulting binary bit values. The first 
step it is to calculate average values in each period (Fig. 
3b). 
Then global average bit value (GAB) is calculated. In an 
ideal situation GAB is exactly halfway between values of 
binary „1‟ and binary „0‟ (the number of 1s and 0s is the 
same). During Phase 1 it was assumed that this value is an 
average for all identified bits (marked with red line in Fig. 
3c). In such a case those bits whose average value is higher 
than GAB are recognized as binary „1‟; otherwise they are 
decoded as binary „0‟. However, this is only true if the 
number of 1s and 0s in the decoded secret data is the same. 
Otherwise such a situation can lead to secret bit decoding 
errors. For example, if there are more binary 1s than 0s then 
the resulting GAB is higher than in an ideal situation where 
they are equally distributed. To solve this issue the 
corrected value of GAB must be calculated GABC = GAB + 
diff, where diff is calculated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
where: N1, N0 denotes the number of 1s and 0s in an 
analysed sequence and V1, V0 are the average measurement 
values for 1s and 0s.  
After the corrected GAB is calculated the binary values 
for each received secret bit are determined again (Fig. 3d). 
If the resulting binary values are different as previously 
calculated, then GAB is corrected again until the values 
before and after corrections are the same or if the number of 
1s and 0s is the same. 
 
Phase 3: Performing symbol synchronization  
Mechanism for determination of the beginning of each 
secret bit, based on finding the lowest variances‟ values 
introduced earlier (Phase 1) applied alone, is not enough for 
successful secret data bits extraction. Please consider an 
example in which the transmitted data bits are [1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 
1]. In this case mechanism of determination of beginning of 
the bits will experience problems as the resulting variances 
will be similar which may lead to transmission errors. 
Therefore another mechanism i.e. character synchronization 
mechanism is needed to synchronize the receiver to the 
secret data bits transmitted by the sender. To achieve this 
goal two symbol synchronization frames (see Fig. 2) are 
added i.e. the sequence of [1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 
0, 1, 0]. The synchronization between the sender and 
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receiver is considered successful if the receiver is able to 
correctly identify at least eight last bits of this sequence. 
 
Phase 4: Performing frame synchronization  
The frame synchronization mechanism makes it possible to 
synchronize SS and SR for 8-bits structures and it allows 
SR to find the beginning and end of the user secret data. 
Therefore before the user data the sequence of [1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 
0, 0, 0] is added and after the user data are transmitted the 
end of the message sequence is indicated by sequence [0, 0, 
0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1] (compare Fig. 2). 
After successful identification of user secret data, SR 
also needs to remove redundant bits inserted by bit stuffing 
algorithm at SS. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
A. Experimental test-bed 
The CloudSteg prototype has been implemented in an 
OpenStack [12] which is an open source cloud computing 
environment created by NASA and Rackspace company. 
Cloud instances were running on a single OpenStack 
server therefore (as mentioned before) we assume that the 
co-residence of the instances determination was 
successfully established. In this environment two 
applications were realized: secret data sender and secret 
data receiver. For determining undetectability of CloudSteg 
we utilized an additional cloud instance called control probe 
(for details see Sec. VC). The utilized test-bed is illustrated 
in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Experimental test-bed for CloudSteg; SS – secret data sender; SR – 
secret data receiver. 
 
B. Performance evaluation measures  
CloudSteg performance depends on the following factors: 
 Bit time length (BT), 
 Probing interval (pri), 
 th (threshold) parameter, 
 The number of accessed files (n) utilized for 
steganographic purposes and nϵN. 
 
The relationships between the abovementioned 
measures are vital to evaluate the performance of the 
method. For example, the choice of the bit time length 
affects directly the steganographic bandwidth. Other 
relationships will be explained below. 
 
Relationship between n and th 
Both parameters n and th affect BER (Bit Error Rate) i.e. 
the correctness of successful receipt of the secret data bits. 
To obtain the optimal values of n and th the following 
experiments were conducted. The measurements were 
performed in “ideal conditions” (Fig. 5) i.e. that on the 
utilized server with OpenStack only two cloud instances 
were active: SS and SR. For these experiments we assumed 
bit time of 10 seconds to not to introduce too many errors 
and pri = 400 ms. To evaluate BER, 96-bits random 
sequence was sent three times. The obtained experimental 
results are illustrated in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6. BER for different values of n and th=0.5 or th=0.9.  
 
Careful inspection of Fig. 6 leads to the following 
observations: 
 For very small (e.g. for th=0.9 it is for n<4) and high 
(e.g. for th=0.9 it is for n>12) n values the BER is the 
highest, therefore such n values should not be utilized 
for hidden transmission. For th=0.5 and n=1, 2 or 3 we 
experienced serious synchronization problems. 
 There is a range of n values for which BER is almost 
0% (e.g. for th=0.9 it is for nϵ<4, 12>). 
 For lower th values threads are sometimes killed too fast 
which may also negatively impact BER. 
 
Determining probing interval 
From the receiver perspective it is important to correctly 
assign the probing interval (pri) as it influences the secret 
data extracting process.  
The following experiments were conducted to determine 
pri influence on the successful reception of the secret data 
bits. The secret data of 24 bits were sent under the 
following conditions: th=0.9, n=5 and BT=10 000 ms (pri is 
expressed as a percentage of bit time). 
  
Fig. 7 illustrates that for every pri value the resulting 
BER is always close to 0. The only exceptions from this 
rule are when pri: 
 is equal to chosen bit time which is a result when pri 
starts in the middle of the bit time (it spans through two 
consecutive secret bit values). Then if values of these 
two bits are ‟1‟ and „0‟ then the calculated averages are 
very similar and it is not trivial to successfully extract 
secret data. 
 is very low e.g. 0.1-0.2% of bit time. 
 
Based on the obtained results it can be established that 
pri value should not be chosen too low or it should not be 
equal to bit time.  
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Fig. 7. BER for different values of pri. 
 
C. Experimental results 
Steganographic bandwidth   
Steganographic bandwidth (SB) was measured by 
transmitting the 96-bits secret bits sequence for every bit 
time value. The other necessary parameters for 
experimental evaluation have been assigned as in Table 1. 
TABLE I.  EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS FOR EVALUATION OF 
STEGANOGRAPHIC BANDWIDTH 
BT [s] 1 2 3 4 5 8 10 
SB [bps] 1 0.5 0.33 0.25 0.2 0.125 0.1 
pri [ms] 40 200 200 200 200 400 400 
n 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 
th 0.4 0.5 0.65 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 
th [ms] 600 1000 1050 1000 1000 1200 1000 
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Fig. 8. BER for different steganographic bandwidth values. 
Fig. 8 presents experimental results for BER for each 
value of the steganographic bandwidth evaluated. The 
proposed method has been able to successfully transmit all 
secret bits for SB of 0.1 bps or lower. It means that the 
chosen BT should be equal to 10 seconds or lower. This 
means that the method achieves 1000 times higher 
steganographic bandwidth than the originally proposed one 
in [7]. It should also be noted that for higher SB the resulting 
BER is higher but e.g. for 0.2 bps it is still below 10%.  
 
Robustness 
Robustness of the proposed steganographic method shows 
how the method is able to survive in the presence of 
unintentional interferences that may occur in the cloud 
computing environment. For CloudSteg, robustness was 
evaluated in the two following, separate scenarios: (i) firstly, 
by adding another cloud instance which focuses solely on 
verifying its hard disk performance (by utilizing bonnie++ 
tool to do the hard disk benchmarking); (ii) secondly, by 
adding another cloud instance which tries to significantly 
impact the disk load. 
The parameters for the first case experimental 
evaluation were set as follows: BT=10 s, n=5, th=0.9, 
pri=400 ms. For every tested scenario the method has 
achieved BER=0 which means that it is ready to survive 
such conditions. 
The second case was a real stress-test for the proposed 
method. The cloud instance was trying as often as possible 
to access the hard disk which significantly impacts the 
robustness of the steganographic method. Experimental 
results for this case showed that the average BER was equal 
to 32.3%. However it must be emphasised that this kind of 
stress-test is not a typical behaviour for cloud instance and 
should, rather, be treated as intentional. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Undetectability evaluation results in a) ideal scenario; b) potential 
real-life scenario. 
 
Undetectability 
For the purpose of undetectability evaluation the control 
probe which is realized as a separate, third instance is 
  
utilized to measure hard disk access times by monitoring its 
load (see Fig. 5). When the files access time is long then the 
hard disk load is high and vice versa. Control probe takes the 
measurements during probing intervals (pri) which are 
constant. Undetectability was evaluated in the following 
“ideal” scenario: first the control probe was launched and 
after some random time the covert communication between 
SS and SR took place. 
It is important to note that the control probe as well as 
SR are not initially synchronized with SS i.e. they are not 
aware when the transmitted secret bit starts. 
The exemplary observed hard disk load diagram is 
presented in Fig. 9a. By visually inspecting the diagram it 
can be noticed that there is a time period where the 
experienced load is higher. Obviously this is a result of the 
absence of other active cloud instances. If any other cloud 
instances are active then the resulting hard disk load 
diagram could be distorted as presented in Fig. 9b thus 
increasing CloudSteg undetectability. 
For cloud provider the potential detection method of 
CloudSteg could be based on pinpointing such cloud 
instances which significantly impacts the hard disk load. In 
such a case it must be emphasised that only SS can be 
potentially discovered as SR does not affect load at all. 
Currently some cloud computing platforms allow to 
monitor parameters of cloud instances e.g. VMware [15] 
provides triggers that can be activated when the hard disk 
load is reached by the certain cloud instance as it is defined 
as a sum of all data read and saved on all cloud instance 
hard disks in the certain time period. However, even such 
an approach can be inaccurate in a dynamic cloud 
computing service due to files‟ operation of other co-
existing cloud instances. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper proposes CloudSteg which is an improved 
steganographic method based on cloud instances hard disk 
contention originally proposed by Ristenpart et al. in [7]. It 
allows the covert exchange of secret data between two cloud 
instances in a cloud computing environment. The method 
was improved mainly by utilization of different 
synchronization mechanisms which made it possible to 
improve resulting steganographic bandwidth 1000 times to 
about 0.1 bps. The proof-of-concept implementation was 
realized in an open source OpenStack environment. 
Future works include CloudSteg implementation in one 
of the public, commercially available cloud computing 
platforms. This could provide a more realistic method‟s 
evaluation which is especially important from the 
undetectability and robustness perspective. 
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